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By Mitchell M.Gans and Jonathan G.Blattmachr

U

nder the
Internal Revenue
1Code
of 1986,
taxpayers are

permitted a federal gift tax
exemption and an estate tax exemption. Although technically not exemptions but more in the nature of exemption "equivalents" that entitle taxpayers to a credit, each is more easily
understood as an exemption. The gift
tax exemption, as so understood, is $1
million for each taxpayer and is not
scheduled to increase. The estate tax
exemption, as also so understood, is $1
million for 2005 and is scheduled to
become $2 million in 2006, 2007, and
2008 and reach $3.5 million in 2009.
There will be no estate tax for individuals dying in 2010. Beginning in 2011,
the estate tax exemption drops to the
gift tax exemption level of $1 million.
Tax Exemptions of
Married Persons
As indicated, each individual has his or
her own gift and estate tax exemption.
It is not portable: one taxpayer cannot
Mitchell M. Gans is a professor of law
at the Hofstra University School of
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transfer his or her unused exemption to
another. Even though the Code can be
understood as treating married couples
as one economic unit for certain transfer-tax purposes, as per the one-economic-unit theory, a surviving spouse's
estate may not use the other spouse's
unused exemption. Nonetheless, in the
case of lifetime gifts, a couple may
share, at least to a limited degree,
exemptions by "gift splitting" under
Code § 2513, which permits one spouse
to consent to be treated as though he or
she made one-half of the gifts made by
the other spouse (except for gifts made
to or for the other spouse). When this
section is operative, one consequence is
that it permits the spouse making the
gift to apply the other spouse's exemption. For example, a wife gives $2 million to her child. Her husband, whether
or not he is the father of the child, may
consent under Code § 2513 to be treated as though he made half of the gift
for federal gift tax purposes. If the election is made, he will report the half
attributed to him on his own gift tax
return and will use any remaining portion of his gift tax exemption. (In addition, if the gift could be subject to generation-skipping transfer tax, such as a
gift to a grandchild, the gift-splitting
spouse-the husband in the foregoing
example-is also treated as the transferor for generation-skipping transfer
tax purposes. That may have the effect

of permitting the spouse who made the
transfer also to use the GST exemption
of the other spouse.)
As suggested, sharing of unused
exemptions by spouses for estate tax
purposes is not permitted, although
such portability has been long proposed. As a result, and to avoid
wasting the exemption, so-called
credit shelter trusts are commonly
used. Such trusts are structured to
use exactly the federal estate tax
exemption of the spouse dying; they
typically provide benefits for the surviving spouse but are structured so
as not to be included in the gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes
of the surviving spouse. These trusts
entail financial and psychological
costs, such as the cost of drafting and
administering the trust and the loss
of control over the trusts' assets by
the surviving spouse. A portable
exemption, under which the surviving spouse would be permitted to
enjoy his or her spouse's unused
exemption, would obviate the need
for credit shelter trusts entirely
(although a trust might be used for
creditor protection and other reasons). If, for example, under current
law, one spouse died and bequeathed
the entire estate to the other spouse,
the exemption would be wasted. If
the Code permitted portable exemptions, however, the surviving

spouse's exemption would be
increased by the unused exemption
of the other spouse. An interesting
issue if such portability were allowed
is whether only the estate tax exemption of the surviving spouse would
be increased or also the gift tax
exemption of that spouse.
Although Congress has thus far
refused to address the issue, the IRS
has begun issuing private letter rulings and national office technical
advice memorandums (which under
Code § 6110(k)(3) may not be cited or
used as precedent) that diminish the
planning problems some taxpayers
face because of the nonportable
nature of the exemption. The principal focus of the rulings appears to be
the case in which a spouse dies with
insufficient assets to use his or her
estate tax exemption in full-a situation that becomes more common as
the exemption increases. In such a
case, the unused exemption is wasted, of course, even though the surviving spouse may have wealth that
is greater than his or her exemption.
With proper planning, the waste of
the exemption could be avoided by
having the wealthier spouse make a
gift to the less wealthy spouse. This
could be accomplished either by an
outright gift or by creating a qualified terminable interest property or
QTIP trust described in Code
§ 2523(f) for the benefit of the less
wealthy spouse. This kind of planning, however, may encounter objections from clients who are unwilling
to relinquish control over assets to
their spouses.
PLR Strategy: Creating a
General Power in the
Deceased Spouse
In the rulings, the IRS has approved
a plan that permits clients who have
such control concerns to avoid wasting the exemption at the death of the
less wealthy spouse. See, e.g., PLR
200403094 (single grantor revocable
trust) and PLRs 200210051,
200101021 (joint grantor trust).
Under the plan, the wealthier spouse
creates a revocable trust that grants
the other spouse a testamentary gen-
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eral power of appointment over sufficient assets such that there will be
no waste of the exemption in the less
wealthy spouse's estate. And because
the wealthier spouse is able to revoke
the trust at any time, the plan does
not entail any surrender of control.
To illustrate, assume the less wealthy
spouse died in 2005 with $500,000 in
assets and had a testamentary general power of appointment over $1 million in assets under the other
spouse's revocable trust. The gross
estate, under the rulings, would be
$1.5 million. In other words, even
though the general power could
have been revoked by the other
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s[ ouses for estate tax
pu poses is not
permitted, a- though
such portabl itv has
been Iong proposed
spouse, it is nonetheless a general
power within the meaning of Code
§ 2041, and the gross estate is, therefore, $1.5 million.
If the less wealthy spouse exercises
the power of appointment in favor of
his or her estate and then directs in
the will that it be placed in a credit
shelter trust for the benefit of the
wealthier spouse, the exemption is
not wasted. It is, of course, critical
that the surviving spouse not be
viewed as the transferor of the assets
passing into the credit shelter trust.
For if that were the case, there would
be two negative consequences:
(1) the wealthier spouse could be
viewed as having made a taxable gift
to the other beneficiaries under the
credit shelter trust at the death of the
less wealthy spouse; and (2) the corpus of the trust could be included in
the wealthier spouse's estate under
Code § 2036 or § 2038, depending on
the nature of the interests or powers
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conferred on the surviving spouse.
Most critical, the rulings conclude
that the wealthier spouse should not
be viewed as the transferor. That
may seem somewhat surprising.
After all, one could easily imagine
that the IRS would be inclined to
invoke the step-transaction doctrine
and thereby treat the wealthier
spouse as the true transferor--or to
argue, similarly, that, under state law,
the wealthier spouse is considered
the transferor for purposes of analyzing creditors' rights and that Code
§ 2036 or § 2038 should therefore
apply at the wealthy spouse's death.
See Griffin v. United States, 42
F. Supp. 2d 700 (W.D. Tex. 1998);
Estate of Cidulka v. Commissioner, 71
T.C.M. (CCH) 255 (1996); Heyen v.
United States, 945 F.2d 359, 363 (10th
Cir. 1991); Paolozzi v. Commissioner,23
T.C. 182 (1954); Estate of Paxton v.
Commissioner,86 T.C. 785 (1986).
Presumably, because of a sensitivity
to the difficulties that nonportability
creates, the rulings do not take this
approach.
The rulings take a taxpayer-friendly approach on another critical issue,
the gift-tax marital deduction. For
the plan to work, the wealthy spouse
must not be viewed as having made
a taxable gift to the less wealthy
spouse. It is, of course, clear that no
completed gift occurs as long as the
trust remains revocable. Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2511-2(c) (second sentence). The
rulings acknowledge as much. But
the more controversial question is
whether a taxable gift occurs at the
death of the less wealthy spouse. The
rulings conclude that the marital
deduction applies and, therefore, no
taxable gift is made. As such, a gift
tax marital deduction is not permitted under Code § 2523(i) for a transfer to a spouse who is not a U.S. citizen, nor is an estate tax marital
deduction permitted under such circumstances unless the transfer is in
the form of a qualified domestic
trust, described in Code § 2056(d). To
be sure, the IRS might have taken a
less taxpayer-friendly position. It
could have denied the marital deduction on the ground that the gift does

not occur until the death of the less
wealthy spouse, reasoning that the
marital deduction contemplates a living donee. Cf. Estate of Dave Gordon v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 404 (1978), acq.
1979-2 C.B. 1. Treas. Reg.
§§ 20.2056(b)-2 ex. 8 and 20.2056(b)4(e) support the position taken in the
rulings by indicating that payments
to the spouse's estate qualify for the
marital deduction, but in each
instance the spouse survived. In contrast, Code § 2056(b)(3)(A) permits a
marital deduction when the bequest
to a spouse will terminate as a result
of the death of the "surviving"
spouse in a common disaster. The
IRS might also have taken the position in the case in which the less
wealthy spouse allows the power to
lapse that the marital deduction
might possibly be denied on the
ground that it constitutes a terminable (nondeductible) interest
within the meaning of Code
§ 2523(b). But, here again, policy concerns about nonportability likely
helped to drive the outcome.
One final issue implicated in the
rulings is the question of income tax
basis. Under Code § 1014, it would
seem, at first blush, that the assets
passing into the credit shelter trust
should qualify for a change in basis.
Code § 1014(e), however, provides
that the section is inapplicable-no
change in basis is permitted-when
the asset is gifted to the decedent
within one year of death and the
asset then passes back to the donor
at the death of the decedent. Relying
on Code § 1014(e), the rulings conclude that the assets in the revocable
trust will not qualify for a change in
basis to the extent that the surviving
spouse receives property from the
decedent as a result of the exercise of
the power (or its lapse). In concluding that Code § 1014(e) is triggered,
the rulings take the view that the gift
is made to the deceased spouse at the
moment of death and, therefore, falls
within the provision's one-year time
frame. In effect, the rulings analogize
to the gift-tax regulations. In other
words, just as the gift does not occur
for gift-tax purposes until the death

of the less wealthy spouse because
the wealthier spouse retains a revocation power, so, too, the gift is not
deemed to occur for purposes of
Code § 1014(e). That kind of analogy
seems to be a sensible one and could
certainly be adopted in regulations.
At the present time, however, there is
no regulation under the section.
If the conclusion that the gift
occurs within the one-year time
frame is correct, the question
becomes how to compute basis.
Although the more recent rulings
give no guidance on this question,
PLR 9321050 suggests that the determination be made by focusing on the
actuarial value of the wealthy
spouse's interest in the trust. In other
words, if the wealthier spouse is
given an income interest in the trust
that has a value equal to, say, 40% of
the value of the trust's assets, then
40% of the trust's assets should not
be eligible for a change in basis
under Code § 1014 (the remaining
60% would be eligible). This
approach raises two questions:
(1) how to determine which assets in
the trust are eligible for a change in
basis and (2) how to value the
wealthy spouse's interest in the trust
when it is discretionary. The first
question may arise, for instance,
when the revocable trust may have
more assets than the amount over
which the surviving spouse has the
general power of appointment. It
might be possible to specify the
order in which the assets in the revocable trust will be used to satisfy the
general power property if the power
is exercised. But it seems likely that
there is some question about which
assets in the revocable trust are
included in the gross estate of the
deceased spouse on account of his or
her general power. In reference to the
second question, as a general rule, a
truly discretionary interest may have
no actuarial value. For example, the
standard Code § 7520 income factor
may not be used to value an income
interest in property when the governing instrument permits trust corpus to be withdrawn for another person's benefit. Treas. Reg.

§ 20.7520-3(b)(2)(ii)(B)(2). However
the calculation is made, it does seem
that taxpayers will be able to enjoy
some change in basis under the rulings-at least for the portion of the
trust deemed to pass to the beneficiaries other than the surviving
spouse.
Other Applications of
the PLR Strategy
Inappropriate Assets Available to
Fund the Credit Shelter Trust
There are two additional contexts in
which the new rulings may be useful
in planning. First, a spouse may have
sufficient assets to use the exemption, but the assets may not be an
ideal candidate for a credit shelter
trust. For example, when a spouse
has pension or IRA assets that could
be used to apply the exemption but
no other assets, or when the spouse
may have insufficient assets other
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than qualified (pension) plan or IRA
assets to use his or her exemption in
full, the couple must decide whether
to secure the estate tax advantage of
making it payable to a credit shelter
trust to avoid wasting the exemption.
If the credit-shelter approach is used,
there is an offsetting income-tax disadvantage: the deferral period for
reporting the distributions will be
shortened. See generally Natalie B.
Choate, Life and Death Planningfor
Retirement Benefits (2003), at 14-26,
56-58, 144-53, for an excellent discussion of "fixed" versus "recalculated" life expectancy methods and
income tax free spousal "rollovers."
In addition, if they opt for the creditshelter approach, the estate-tax outcome is sub-optimal: when dealing
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with pension-type assets, which generally will represent the right to
income in respect of a decedent
(IRD), the surviving spouse's estate
tax can be reduced by making the
benefit payable to the spouse, rather
than to the trust. The right to IRD is
not entitled to the change in basis
under Code § 1014(a). See Code
§ 1014(c). Deferred compensation,
such as interests in a qualified (pension) plan or individual retirement
account (IRA), represent the right to
IRD as a general rule. See Hess v.
United States, 271 F.2d 104 (3d Cir.
1959). The advantage, in other
words, that the credit shelter trust
offers, when the trust is funded with
the right to IRD, is eroded by the
income tax on the distributions that
the trust must bear. Whereas, if the
benefit is made payable directly to
the spouse, the income tax paid by
the spouse reduces the amount even-
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§ 1014(b)(5) and (d). If the wife were
to die in 2005 survived by her husband, she could direct that her IRA
pass into a credit shelter trust to
avoid wasting her $1.5 million
exemption. But this would, as indicated, shorten the deferral period.
And, given the erosion resulting
from the trust's income tax liability, it
also would not be as estate-tax effective as making the benefit payable to
her husband. If the approach
approved in the rulings were adopted, however, an optimal outcome
could be achieved: the wife would
simply make her husband the beneficiary of the IRA, and he would transfer his assets to a revocable trust
under which she was given a general
power of appointment. Under this
arrangement, the husband's non-IRD
assets would be used to fund the
credit shelter trust created at the
wife's death, and the IRA would pass
directly to the husband-thus producing no waste of the exemption,
no shortening of the deferral period,
and no erosion. But it should be
noted that the advantage of using the
surviving spouse's assets may be
eroded if Code § 1014(e) applies to
them, as suggested by the private letter rulings. Nevertheless, as
explained, it seems that some change
in basis under Code § 1014(a) should
occur.
Insufficient Assets Available to
Fund Both Exemptions

tually subject to estate tax at his or
her death. If, however, the plan
approved in the rulings is used, the
couple can avoid wasting the exemption without suffering that erosion
and without shortening the deferral
period for income tax purposes.
To illustrate, assume that a wife
has $1.5 million in her IRA and no
other assets and that the husband
has $1.5 million in non-IRD assets.
Ideally, these assets of the husband
would be of the type entitled to the
change in basis under Code
§ 1014(a). Assets other than the right
to IRD also may be denied a change
in basis under the section. E.g., Code
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The second context in which the rulings could prove to be helpful is
when the couple wants to take full
advantage of their exemptions but
does not have sufficient aggregate
wealth to secure this outcome. For
example, assume that a couple has
an aggregate wealth of $2.5 million
and that they want to use available
exemptions fully because they
believe that they will eventually have
very substantial estates. In 2005, with
an exemption of $1.5 million, the
couple presumably would be
advised to title $1.5 million of their
assets in the name of the spouse with
the shorter life expectancy. But, of
course, the order of death typically is
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not easily forecast. And if the spouse
with the longer life expectancy were
to die immediately with an estate of
$1 million, part of the exemption
($500,000) would be wasted. Under
the rulings, that result can be avoided. If each spouse were to create a
revocable trust that conferred a general power on the other, the entire
$1.5 million exemption would be
used irrespective of the order of their
deaths. It may be that the couple
together does not have enough combined wealth even to use one exemption fully. For example, the husband
has $500,000 and the wife has
$750,000, for combined wealth of
$1.25 million, which is less than the
available exemption for the years
2005 through 2009. Nevertheless, the
strategy approved in the rulings permits the couple to use as much of the
exemption of the first of them to die
as is possible.
A Conservative Approach to
Adopting the PLR Strategy
In all of these cases, the rulings solve
the problems of nonportability. The
IRS obviously resolved all of the legal
uncertainties in the rulings in favor of
taxpayers to reach a salutary outcome
in policy terms. And, although the IRS
should be applauded for taking this
policy-driven approach, taxpayers will
continue to entertain doubts about
relying on the rulings until published
guidance is provided.
Given the nonbinding nature of private letter rulings and the difficulties
practitioners face, as a consequence, it
may be prudent to take a conservative
approach in terms of drafting and
planning to minimize the risk that the
IRS would succeed were it to disavow
the rulings. Practitioners who implement the approach approved in the
rulings, perhaps, should consider
adopting the three recommendations
that follow
First, the spouse who receives a
general power should exercise it,
rather than allowing it to lapse.
Although the rulings do not require
this, it would seem that the IRS
could argue that a spouse who
receives a power of appointment and

allows it to lapse has received a terminable interest that does not qualify
for the gift-tax marital deduction. On
the other hand, if the power is exercised, the terminable-interest argument would appear to be foreclosed.
See Rev. Rul. 82-184, 1982-2 C.B. 215.
Second, the surviving spouse
should be given a special power of
appointment under the credit shelter
trust that is created through the exercise of the other spouse's general
power. The special power should be
exercisable during life and at death.
Under this structure, it would seem
that the IRS could not argue that the
surviving spouse has made a taxable
gift of the remainder interest at the
other spouse's death. For even if the
IRS changes its position and takes
the view that the surviving spouse is
the transferor, no taxable-gift argument can be made successfully when
the transferor has a special power
that is immediately exercisable,
because the gift of the remainder
would be incomplete. Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2511-2(c). This is illustrated in
Goldstein v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 897
(1962), in which the court intimated
that a taxable gift might occur if the
time for exercising the special power
is delayed.
Third, the grantor of the revocable
trust should give the other spouse a
mandatory income interest that qualifies the property over which the
deceased spouse has the general
power for QTIP treatment. The general power granted to the first
spouse to die might cause the property to qualify for the marital deduction under Code § 2523(e) (a general
power of appointment trust) rather
than Code § 2523(f) (a QTIP trust).
But for the trust to qualify under
Code § 2523(e), the general power
must be exercisable by the spouse
alone and in all events. Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2523(e)-l(a)(4). Some condition

could be built in: for example, the
spouse can only exercise the power if
he or she is under the age of 115 at
the time of death. The built-in condition should prevent it from qualifying for the marital deduction under
Code § 2523(e), so an election may be

made to have it qualify under Code
§ 2523(f), in order that the trust will
not be included in the surviving
spouse's estate under Code § 2036 or
§ 2038. In addition, the credit shelter
trust created for the benefit of the
grantor through the exercise of the
general power at the death of the
first spouse should limit the trustee's
discretion in terms of distributions to
the grantor (an ascertainable standard relating to health, education,
maintenance, and support should be

used). If this suggestion is implemented, it would seem that the IRS
would be precluded from including
the trust in the estate of the surviving spouse (the grantor of the revocable trust) on a creditors' rights theory. See Paolozzi, 23 T.C. at 182; Paxton,
86 T.C. at 785. In other words, even
if, under state law, creditors of a
transferor can reach trust assets
when the trustee has discretion to
make distributions to the transferor
and even if the grantor would be
viewed as the transferor of the credit
shelter trust-on the rationale that
the exercise of the general power by
the other spouse should be ignored
as a prearranged step designed to
give the transferor access to the
trust's assets-inclusion in the
grantor's estate would nonetheless
appear to be precluded. For, under
the QTIP regulations, once the QTIP
beneficiary has died, neither Code
§ 2036 nor § 2038 can apply at the

death of the spouse who created it
even if he or she has a beneficial
interest in the trust or a power over
it. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(f)-1(f) ex. 11.
And while Code § 2041 might interact with a creditors' rights theory
under state law to produce inclusion
in the surviving spouse's estate, the
use of an ascertainable standard
should eliminate this possibility. In
summary, neither Code § 2036 nor
§ 2038 can apply even if the surviving spouse is treated as having created the credit shelter trust because it
will have been treated as a QTIP
trust for the spouse dying first. That
is so even if the so-called creditors'
rights theory of Paolozzi, 23 T.C. at
182, and similar precedent is
invoked-those cases cause Code
§§ 2036 and/or 2038 to applybecause the QTIP regulation cited
above forecloses the application of
those sections. Moreover, a power
exercisable only under an ascertainable standard described in Code
§ 2041 forecloses the power from
being a general power of appointment. Hence, the credit shelter trust
should not be included in the gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes
of the surviving spouse, despite the
interests and powers the survivor
will hold over the trust. Thus, even if
the IRS were to abandon its taxpayer-friendly approach and invoke a
creditor's rights theory, documents
drafted in the manner suggested
would likely produce a favorable
outcome.
Some Additional
Practical Points
The surviving spouse should file a
gift tax return and any applicable
state gift tax return, disclosing the
gift to the other spouse and claiming
QTIP marital-deduction treatment.
Assuming adequate disclosure under
Code § 6501(c)(9), the statute of limitations for the IRS to challenge the
allowance of the marital deduction
will expire in three years when
there is not a greater than 25%
omission from the return. See Code
§ 6501(e)(2). That means that, if no
timely and successful challenge to
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the allowance of the marital deduction is made by the IRS, the credit
shelter trust should be excluded from
the surviving spouse's estate.

Conclusion
The recent rulings produce a taxpayer-friendly outcome in many cases in
which the nonportable nature of the
estate-tax exemptions makes planning and drafting difficult. But, until
published guidance is issued on
some of the complicated issues that
the rulings resolve in favor of taxpayers, practitioners may find it prudent to draft conservatively and,
therefore, implement some of the
suggestions made in this article.
Implementing the Strategy
To implement the strategy approved in
the rulings, each spouse creates a revocable trust or the couple creates a joint
revocable trust. The trusts or trust
must be funded with a sufficient
amount of property before either
spouse dies to ensure that the spouse
who dies first has a general power of
appointment (causing estate tax inclusion under Code § 2041) over an adequate level of property such that his or
her exemption will be used optimally.
For example, if each spouse has $1 million titled in his or her name and they
have an additional $500,000 in assets,
the $500,000 sum could be placed in
the revocable trust so the first to die
will have an estate for federal estate
tax purposes of $1.5 million. Of course,
the key is the amount of the taxable
estate of the spouse dying first, not the
gross estate. Also, values in the trust
will vary over time and the federal
estate tax exemption is scheduled to
increase over the years. Hence, it probably is preferable for the spouses to
transfer substantially more to the revocable trust than the minimum expected to be needed to avoid wasting the
exemption in the estate of the first
spouse to die.
The provision that would be
added to the revocable trust might be
similar to the following, which is
sample language derived from
Wealth Transfer Planning-, a computer software system of which Mr.
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Blattmachr and Michael L. Graham
are co-authors and that is published
by InterActive Legal Systems
(www.ilsdocs.com), which has granted its permission for the language to
be reproduced here.
Grant of General Power of
Appointment. If the Grantor's
husband/wife predeceases the
Grantor, then upon the death of
the Grantor's husband/wife if the
Grantor's husband/wife is then
under the age of 115 years, the
trustees acting hereunder shall
transfer the lesser of (a) all property held hereunder at the time of
the death of the Grantor's husband/wife or (b) a SUM\FRACTIONAL SHARE) of all property
then held hereunder, which shall
be the amount, if any, by which
(i) the Unused Applicable
Exclusion Amount of the
Grantor's husband/wife exceeds
(ii) the value of the taxable estate
of the Grantor's husband/wife
(determined by excluding the
value of property subject to this
general power of appointment) to
such one or more persons (including the estate of the Grantor's husband/wife) on such terms as the
Grantor's husband/wife may
appoint by a Will specifically
referring to this power of appointment. (If the lesser of "(a)" and
"(b)" is "(b)" and if the trustees
hold property that would represent the right to income in respect
of a decedent within the meaning
of Code Sec. 691 at the death of
the Grantor's husband/wife, then
the power of appointment hereby
granted to the Grantor's husband/wife shall be applied first to
property that does not represent
the right to income in respect of
decedent and shall be exercisable
with respect to property that does
represent the right to income in
respect of a decedent only to the
extent necessary to permit the
Grantor's husband/wife to be
able to exercise the power in full
to the extent of the lesser of "(a)"
and "(b)".) The "Unused
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Applicable Exclusion Amount of
the Grantor's husband/wife"
means the largest taxable estate
the Grantor's husband/wife could
have at the time of his/her death
without incurring any Federal
estate tax. To the extent this power
of appointment is not effectually
exercised by the Grantor's husband/wife, the property subject to
the power shall be paid over to
the Executor under the Will
[change to "personalrepresentativeof
the estate" if appropriate]of the
Grantor's husband/wife to
become part of his/her estate. If
the Grantor's husband/wife (or
the Executor of the Will of the
Grantor's husband/wife) disclaims the general power of
appointment granted under this
paragraph, that power shall be
expunged as of the date of death
of the Grantor's husband/wife
and treated as though never
granted.
The language for a joint revocable
trust (that is, one created by both
spouses) might be similar to the
following:
Grant of General Power of
Appointment. Upon the death of
the First Decedent [many practitioners, in drafting "joint" revocable
trusts, refer to the husband and wife
as "Trustors" as they both create the
trust. Others refer to the "husband
and wife," the "Settlors," the
"Grantors"or some other term. The
term in this provision should be modified in accordance with the "naming"
convention for the husband and wife
used in the joint revocable trust], the
trustee acting hereunder shall
transfer upon the death of the
First Decedent, if the First
Decedent is then under the age of
115 years, the lesser of (a) all property held hereunder at the time of
the death of the First Decedent
consisting of the Surviving
Spouse's separate property and
the Surviving Spouse's one-half
interest in community property
[remove the reference to "community

property" if appropriate]or (b) a
{SUM\FRACTIONAL SHARE} of
the Surviving Spouse's separate
property and the Surviving

Spouse's one-half interest in community property then held hereunder equal to the amount, if any,
by which (i) the First Decedent's
Applicable Exclusion Amount
exceeds (ii) the value of the First
Decedent's taxable estate (determined by excluding the value of
property subject to this power) to
such one or more persons (including First Decedent's estate) on
such terms as the First Decedent
may appoint by a Will specifically
referring to this power of appointment. (If the lesser of "(a)" and
"(b)" is "(b)" and if the trustees
hold property that would represent the right to income in respect
of a decedent within the meaning
of Code Sec. 691 at the death of
the First Decedent, then the power
of appointment hereby granted to

the First Decedent shall be applied
first to property that does not represent the right to income in
respect of decedent and shall be
exercisable with respect to property that does represent the right to
income in respect of a decedent
only to the extent necessary to
permit the First Decedent to be
able to exercise the power in full
to the extent of the lesser of "(a)"
and "(b)".) The First Decedent's
"Unused Applicable Exclusion
Amount" means the largest taxable estate the First Decedent
could have at the time of the First
Decedent's death without incurring any Federal estate tax. To the
extent this power of appointment
is not effectually exercised by the
First Decedent, the property subject to the power shall be paid
over to the Executor under the
Will of the First Decedent to
become part of his or her estate. If
the First Decedent (or the
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Executor of the Will of the First
Decedent) disclaims the general
power of appointment granted
under this paragraph, that power
shall be expunged as of the date of
death of the First Decedent and
treated as though never granted.
As mentioned above, it seems
preferable for the spouse dying first
to exercise the general power of
appointment. Here is a sample of
how the exercise might be described
in that spouse's will:
Exercise of Power of
Appointment. Under [describe
trust agreement], I may hold a
power to appoint certain property
held thereunder at the time of my
death. I hereby exercise that
power and direct that all property
subject to that power of appointment be added to my estate to
become a part thereof. U
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Keeping Current-Probate offers a
look at selected recent cases, rulings
and regulations, literature, and legislation. The editors of Probate & Property
welcome suggestions and contributions
from readers.

ABATEMENT: Trust language controls. The marital trust created from the
decedent's revocable lifetime trust
directed that the trustees pay the trust's
pro rata share of estate tax in the surviving spouse's estate and then directed that stock in a closely held company
and one-quarter of other assets be distributed to decedent's nieces and
nephews with the remaining threequarters to the decedent's brother-inlaw. The court in In re Rinaldo Revocable
Trust, 696 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2005), held
that federal law does not apply to
abatement and whether or not the gift
of closely held stock is similar to a specific bequest is irrelevant because language requiring the trust to pay its pro
rata share requires that all assets in the
trust abate ratably.

Keeping Current-Probate Editor:
Prof. Gerry W. Beyer, Texas Tech
University School of Law, Lubbock,
TX 79409, gwb@ProfessorBeyer.com.
Contributors include Dave L.
Cornfeld, Claire G. Hargrove,
Christopher L. Harris, and Prof.
William P. LaPiana.
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CHARITABLE GIFTS: Property given
in trust lost its trust character after
trustees expended it for charitable
purpose. The testator's will devised a
portion of the residue in trust for the
benefit of a hospital to be spent as
directed by a committee of persons
named in the will to create a memorial
to the testator's family The comnmittee
expended the trust property to build a
chapel on the hospital grounds completed in 1956. In 2003, the hospital
decided to raze the chapel to expand
its facilities. The court determined that
(1) the expenditure of the trust property to build the chapel terminated the
testamentary trust, (2) the will did not
create a successor trust with the hospital as trustee, and (3) the will did not
create a condition subsequent. St.
Mary's Medical Center, Inc. v. McCarthy,
829 N.E.2d 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION: Doctrine not applicable if subsequent will expressly revokes prior
will. The decedent was the donee of a
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power of appointment the exercise of
which required the fulfillment of certain
conditions. After executing two wills that
exercised the power in accordance with
the required conditions, the decedent executed a new will expressly revoking all
prior wills and purporting to exercise the
power but which failed to fulfill the conditions. The court held that the property
subject to the power passed to the default
taker because the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation cannot apply if the revocation is made by a completely valid will
with an express revocation clause. Rosoff v.
Harding,901 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2005). Compare Wehrhein v. Golden
Pond Assisted Living Facility,905 So. 2d
1002 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (if the revocation clause is not invalidated by undue
influence, dependent relative revocation is
not applicable).
DIVERSIFICATION: Language allowing
retention of stock of corporate trustee
does not negate duty to diversify. The
decedent's inter vivos trust allowed the
trustee to retain property added to the
trust, including shares of a corporate
trustee. After the decedent's death, the
corporate trustee sold other assets to raise
necessary cash, increasing the concentration in its own stock to 86%. The stock
declined greatly in value during the twoyear period between death and the final
distribution of the trust. The court in Wood
v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 828 N.E.2d 1072 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2005), held that the permission to
retain stock of the corporate trustee overrode the duty of loyalty but that express
language is necessary to override the duty
to diversify as expressed in Ohio's version
of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act,
which codified the common law of diversification. A retrial was necessary to determine if the statutory "special circumstances" excusing a lack of diversification
were present.
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS:
Fifth Circuit upholds StrangiII. The
decedent transferred assets to a FLP in
exchange for a 99% limited partnership
interest. In Strangi v. Commissioner,417
E3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005), the court stated:
"[Wle hold that the Tax Court did not
clearly err in finding that Strangi's transfer
of assets to [the family limited partnership] lacked a substantial non-tax pur-

pose. Accordingly, the 'bona fide sale'
exception to § 2036(a) is not triggered, and
the transferred assets are properly included within the taxable estate. We therefore
affirm the estate tax deficiency assessed
against the Estate."
FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY: Trustee
liable for negligently providing information. A bank advised its client to make
present interest annual exclusion gifts to
an irrevocable trust to reduce estate taxes.
An attorney selected by the client drafted
the trust, but the trust but did not include
a Crummey power. Three years after the
creation of the trust, a trust officer told the
drafting attorney about the problem, but
nothing was done. The bank continued to
advise the client to contribute to the trust.
In Hatlebergv.Norwest Bank Wisconsin, 700
N.W.2d 15 (Wis. 2005), the court held that
the bank was liable for the increased estate
taxes because the bank negligently provided information by advising the client to
make gifts to a trust it knew to be deficient.
INCIDENTAL BENEFICIARIES:
Organizations with similar purposes to
charitable trust do not have standing. An
animal welfare organization presented its
accounting as the trustee of a charitable
trust for its exclusive benefit and petitioned for permission to pledge the trust
property as collateral for a line of credit.
Other animal welfare organizations
opposed the petition, asserting that they
had an interest in the trustee beneficiary
continuing to provide services they would
otherwise have to provide. The court in In
re Public Benev. Trust of Crume, 829 N.E.2d
1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), held that the
objectants were not persons having an
interest in the trust and thus did not have
standing. The court also determined that
the doctrines of equitable deviation and cy
pres did not apply.
NONPROBATE PROPERTY: Writing sufficient to restore beneficiary. Local law
allows the owner of a nonprobate asset to
pass the asset under the owner's will and
to override the change made in the will by
a writing naming the original or a new
beneficiary. In In re Estate of Cordero, 113
P.3d 16 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005), the testator
executed a will changing the beneficiary of
an investment account from the joint tenant he had placed on the account to his

estate. Two years later, he and the former joint tenant met with his broker,
and the testator signed an instrument
setting forth the reasons for changing
the investments in the account and
stating that the former joint tenant
planned to retain the new investment
if the testator died during the next
five years. The court determined that
this document was sufficient to
restore the joint tenancy with right of
survivorship.
TAX APPORTIONMENT: State tax
apportioned against QTIP under federal provision. In In re Estate of Karner,
113 P3d 150 (Colo. 2005), the court held
as a matter of first impression that the
apportionment of estate tax due
Colorado under its "pick-up" tax
because of the taxation of a QTIP trust
in the surviving spouse's estate is governed by Code § 2207A and not by the
Colorado tax apportionment statute.
Overriding statutory apportionment
therefore requires an indication of specific intent to alter the statutory rule.
TRUST INVESTMENTS: Trustee has
no fiduciary duty to remainder beneficiaries to produce growth equal to or
greater than rate of inflation. The
decedent created a testamentary trust
with mandatory income to son, discretion to invade principal for son if
"absolutely necessary" to provide
essential support, and the remainder to
the son's descendants. The son and a
bank were co-trustees. At the son's
insistence, the trust property was
invested in tax-exempt property. After
the son's death, the remainder beneficiaries sued alleging breach of duty by
the bank. In SunTrust Bank v. Merritt,
612 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005), the
court held that the gift of all the income
to the son means that the bank did not
breach any duty by allowing son to
maximize the income and that there is
no duty to invest to keep pace with
inflation.
WILLS: Constructive death of exspouse does not fulfill condition
precedent of death. Local law provides
that on divorce, all provisions in a will
in favor of the testator's former spouse
are read as if the former spouse had
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predeceased the testator. The testator
died after divorce without altering his
will, which gave the residue to his then
spouse or, if they died simultaneously
or if the spouse did not survive by thirty days, to his spouse's daughter. The
testator's ex-spouse survived him by
more than 30 days. The court held that
the statute voids the gift to the exspouse but does not effect the other
provisions of the will. Thus, the condition on the gift to the stepdaughter did
not occur, and there being no further
gift over, the testator died intestate. In
re Estate of Nash, 164 S.W.3d 856 (Tex.
App. 2005).
WILLS: "No residue of a residue" rule
affirmed. Three of the eighteen residuary beneficiaries predeceased the testator, leaving no issue surviving the
testator, so that the anti-lapse statute
did not apply. The court held that the
common law rule applied and thus the
lapsed residuary gifts passed via intestacy. The court refused to imply survivorship language into the gift as is
done in many states to avoid intestacy.
In re Estate ofMcFarland,167 S.W.3d 299
(Tenn. 2005).

Advance Directives. With an emphasis
on Illinois law, Helen W. Gunnarsson
explains how to Help Your Client Choose
the Right Advance Directive,93 M. B.J.
284 (2005).
Arkansas Trust Code. Lynn Foster provides guidance to Arkansas practitioners and judges in her article, The
Arkansas Trust Code: Good Law for
Arkansas, 27 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.
191 (2005).
Divorce and Trusts. By using Colorado
law as an example, Marc A. Chorney
explains Interests in Trusts as Property in
Dissolutionof Marriage:Identification and
Valuation, 40 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 1
(2005).
Family Limited Partnerships. Louis S.
Harrison and John M. Janiga conclude
that there are substantive economic justifications for FLPs in The Interplay of
&
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Behavioral Economics and Portfolio
Management with the Current
Examinationof Family Partnershipsby the
Courts, 40 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 117
(2005).
Half-blooded Heirs. In Consanguinity,
Sibling Relationships,and the Default
Rules of InheritanceLaw: Reshaping Halfblood Statutes to Reflect the Evolving
Family, 58 SMU L. Rev. 137 (2005),
Ralph C. Brashier discusses the increasingly common issues that arise with
blended families.
Legal Orphans. Richard L. Brown
addresses the inheritance rights of legal
orphans in Disinheritingthe "Legal
Orphan":InheritanceRights of Children
After Termination of ParentalRights, 70
Mo. L. Rev. 125 (2005).
Marital Property Leslie Joan Harris, in
her article Tracing,Spousal Gifts, and
Rebuttable Presumptions:Puzzles of
Oregon Property DistributionLaw, 83 Or.
L. Rev. 1291 (2004), contends that marital property law, particularly divorce
property law, expresses some of the
most fundamental assumptions about
a culture's understanding of marriage.
Same-Sex Couples. In Essential Estate
Planningfor the Constitutionally
Unrecognized Families in Oklahoma:
Same-Sex Couples, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 479
(2005), authors Camille M. Quinn and
Shawna S. Baker contrast the legal
hardships confronting same-sex couples with the legal rights available to
those who are legally entitled to marry
in Oklahoma.
Special Needs Trusts. Jason D. Lazarus
dispels a dozen myths associated with
how to Protect Public Benefitsfor Your
Special-needsClient,Trial, June 2005, at 44.
Tortious Interference with Inheritance
Rights. Diane J. Klein explores the
development of the tort cause of action
in A DisappointedYankee in Connecticut
(or Nearby) ProbateCourt: Tortious
Interference with Expectationof
Inheritance-A Survey with Analysis of
State Approaches in the First, Second, and
Third Circuits, 66 U. Pitt L. Rev. 235
(2004).
'0 PROBTE

Trust Intent. The Intention of the Settlor
Under the Un Form Trust Code: Whose
PropertyIs It, Anyway?, 38 Akron L.
Rev. 649 (2005), by Alan Newman
explores the inherent tension between
allowing testators to determine the disposition of their property and preventing the dead from perpetually controlling the living.
Trusts and Beneficiaries. In Trust
Transparency,93 111. B.J. 278 (2005),
Helen W. Gunnarsson reveals the
results of an e-mail discussion among
members of the Illinois bar, which
revealed that most participants
believed that a beneficiary is entitled to
see the trust instrument.
Unitrusts. The ubiquitous use of 5%
return unitrusts is the focus of an article by Joel C. Dobris entitled Wy Five?
The Strange, Magnetic, and Mesmerizing
Affect of the Five Percent Unitrustand
Spending Rate on Settlors, Their Advisers,
and Retirees, 40 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J.
39 (2005).
Will Contests. Ray J. Koenig II and
Adam S. Kornblatt examine the illinois
law applicable to Disappointed Would-be
Legatees: Who Has Standing to Contest a
Will?, 9311. B.J. 294 (2005).
Will Formalities. Sean P. Milligan
explores how strict compliance with
will formalities can lead to unjust
results and a frustration of testamentary intent in his article, The Effect of a
Harmless Error in Executing a Will: Why
Texas Should Adopt Section 2-503 of the
Uniform ProbateCourt, 36 St. Mary's LJ.
787 (2005).
Wisconsin's Inheritance Tax. Jack
Stark tracks both political and constitutional history in A History of the
Wisconsin Inheritance Tax, 88 Marq. L.
Rev. 947 (2005).

California authorizes a trustee, unless
prohibited by the governing instrument, to convert a trust into a unitrust,
under specified procedures. 2005 Cal.
Legis. Serv. 100.
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Florida adopts the Florida Uniform
Disclaimer of Property Interests Act. This
Act is modeled after the Uniform
Disclaimer of Property Interests Act but
contains substantial enhancements to
many sections of the UDPIA. 2005 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv. 2005-108.
Hawaii authorizes trusts for the care of
pet animals. 2005 Haw. Sess. Laws 160.
Maine creates a streamlined procedure to
review acts of an agent if the principal
resides in a long-term care facility. 2005
Me. Legis. Serv 283.
Maine validates durable powers of attorney executed in compliance with the
laws of other states. 2005 Me. Legis. Serv
284.
New Hampshire makes technical corrections to its version of the Uniform Trust
Code. 2005 N.H. Laws 270.
North Carolina enacts a modified version of the Uniform Trust Code. The
effective date is January 1, 2006. 2005 N.C.
Sess. Laws 192.
Oregon restricts the ability of a person
who physically or financially abuses a
decedent to inherit and to be a beneficiary under a will and under many nonprobate arrangements. The disqualification exists even if there is no nexus
between the abuse and the decedent's
death or the dispositive instrument. 2005
Or. Laws 270 & 535.
Oregon enacts the Uniform Trust Code.
The effective date is January 1, 2006. 2005
Or. Laws 348.
Oregon excludes "special marital property" from its inheritance tax. 2005 Or.
Laws 124.
Texas adds many Uniform Trust Code
concepts into the Texas Trust Code, 2005
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 148. E
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